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The Relationship of Just Compensation to
The Land Use Regulatory Power:
An Analysis and Proposal
THOMAS P. CLARK, JR.* and
ARTHUR G. KIDMAN**
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
commands "nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation." These dozen words have produced volumes
of argument, analysis and opinion, the great bulk of which relate
to the "taking" issue. Scholars, lawyers, and judges have been so
intrigued by the question of whether any given governmental act,
which has an impact on private property, is or is not a "taking",
that the consequences of finding a taking have scarcely been exam-
ined. This preoccupation with the "taking" issue has led to careless
use of language and to misconceptions of law. In discussing the
"taking" issue, it has been widely assumed that where there is a
"taking", compensation is required.
Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the famous case of Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon' stated what we think is the correct rule
* A.B. University of Notre Dame; J.D. University of Missouri, Kansas
City School of Law; Associate with Rutan and Tucker.
** A.B. Washington State University; J.D. University of Chicago; As-
sociate with Rutan and Tucker.
1. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
respecting the consequences of finding a "taking". He said that
when the diminution in property value caused by a governmental
action "reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there
must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain
the act."'2 A governmental act which results in a taking cannot
stand unless there is compensation as required by the fifth amend-
ment. Otherwise, it is clear from the holding in the case, the act
must be declared unconstitutional.
While the rule was correctly stated in Pennsylvania Coal, impre-
cise use of language in other decisions has led to confusion. In
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, New York,3 the Supreme Court
said "this is not to say, however, that governmental action in the
form of regulation cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking
which constitutionally requires compensation. Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon.' '4 While this statement in Goldblatt is not nec-
essarily at odds with the rule from Pennsylvania Coal, it certainly
implies that where a taking is found, compensation will be required.
A recent California court of appeal decision carried this implica-
tion to its logical conclusion. In HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court,5 a
City of Cerritos ordinance down zoned certain property from com-
mercial to residential, thereby reducing its value from $400,000.00
to $75,000.00. The trial court dismissed a cause of action in inverse
condemnation for failure to state a cause of action. In reversing,
the court of appeal stated:
We do hold that in certain appropriate cases, even a valid exer-
cise of the police power can invoke the application of the principle
of inverse condemnation.
Petitioners here have adequately alleged that the City's rezoning
of the property in question amounts to a 'taking' or 'damaging' for
public use for which compensation must be paid. Their complaint
thus states a cause of action for inverse condemnation .. .
2. Id. at 413 (Emphasis added).
3. 369 U.S. 5901 (1962).
4. Id. at 594.
5. 41 Cal. App. 3d 908, 116 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1974).
6. Id. at 920, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
Notwithstanding the purported "holding" in HFH, Ltd. that even the valid
exercise of police power may constitute compensable takings, the Court
found facts suggesting that the city's down zoning was "arbitrary and dis-
criminatory" (41 Cal. App. 3d at 916, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 442). It necessarily
follows that the zoning regulation was an invalid exercise of police power
or a "taking". Conceptually, these issues presented in the HFH, Ltd., differ
very little from those in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926),
the major distinction being that Euclid involved initial zoning and HFH,
Ltd., a re-zoning. We believe that in light of numerous authorities ruling
that a landowner has no vested right in existing zoning this distinction
has no significant weight. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477,
234 P. 381 (1925); Wheat v. Barrett, 210 Cal. 193, 290 P. 1033 (1930); Ander-
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Our purpose in writing is limited to providing an analysis of
major cases with respect to the supposed requirement of compensa-
tion for the invalid exercise of police power. Our focus is primarily
upon land use cases. Our analysis of decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, the courts of California, and other leading jurisdic-
tions reveals that the taking/just compensation clause has been in-
terpreted as a disabling provision. Governmental acts which result
in the taking of private property for public use without compensa-
tion have been found to be unconstitutional and void. Compensa-
tion has not been required because such acts are nullities. We have
found that unless a governmental act affects a confiscation or an
actual physical invasion of land for governmental or public pur-,
poses, no compensation is required. If a governmental act does not
reach the level of confiscation but nonetheless results in a "taking"
of private property for public use without compensation, the sole
remedy is invalidation of the government actions.
At the conclusion of our analysis of the cases we propose a pos-
sible solution to the difficulties we see in the present state of the
law. We recognize that competing policy considerations exist
respecting the proper balance between the public need to regulate
land use and the desire of private owners to utilize their property
in the most economic manner.
I. SUPREMCE COURT CASES
In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,7 private property had been flooded
by the back water of a dam constructed pursuant to a Wisconsin
statute. It was argued that there had been no taking within the
meaning of the Constitution and that the damage was merely a con-
sequential result of the state's power to improve a navigable
waterway. The Supreme Court held that the landowner was en-
titled to compensation even though his title had not been disturbed.
The property, however, had been rendered valueless by govern-
mental action which amounted to physical invasion.
son v. City Council, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964). Even
if there was a "taking" we agree with Justice Fleming's dissent in HFH,
Ltd. that the court's conclusion, that a cause of action in inverse condemna-
tion had been stated, was error.
7. 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
Sixteen years later, in Mugler v. Kansas,8 the United States Su-
preme Court specifically limited Pumpelly to situations where there
is a "physical invasion" of private property and a "practical ouster"
of possession. In Mugler, a beer brewery, having no alternative
use, became valueless when the state prohibited the manufacture,
distribution or sale of alcoholic beverages. The alleged damage to
property was found to be incidental to the accomplishment of a
valid state objective. Accordingly, the Court held that there was
no compensable taking.
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, rejected the land-
owner's contention that the doctrine of the Pumpelly case required
compensation.
The question in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. arose under the
State's power of eminent domain; while the question now before
us arises under what are, strictly, the police powers of the State,
exerted for the protection of the health, morals, and safety of the
people. That case, as this court said in Transportation Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 642, was an extreme qualification of the doctrine,
universally held, that 'acts done in the proper exercise of govern-
mental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property,
though these consequences may impair its use,' do not constitute
a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision, or en-
title the owner of such property to compensation from the State
or its agents, or give him a right of action. It was a case in which
there was a 'permanent invasion of the real estate of the private
owner, and a practical ouster of his possession.' His property was,
in effect, required to be devoted to the use of the public, and, con-
sequently, he was entitled to compensation. 9
After distinguishing Pumpelly, the Court clearly and unequivo-
cally held that a valid exercise of the police power cannot amount
to a constitutionally compensable taking.
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that
are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, mor-
als, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be
deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control
or use vf his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right
to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the state that its use
by anyone, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the pub-
lic interests. Nor can legislation of that character come within the
Fourteenth Amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent that its
real object is not to protect the community, or to promote the gen-
eral well-being, but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive
the owner of his liberty and property, without due process of law.10
Moreover, the police power must not be "burdened" with require-
ments of compensation. In this regard, Justice Harlan stated:
8. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
9. Id. at 668.
10. Id. at 668-69 (Emphasis added).
[VOL. 2: S79, 1974] Land Use
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property
which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in
a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very
different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a
person of his property without due process of law."
According to Justice Harlan, there is a difference in kind between
the police power and eminent domain, not a difference in the degree
of regulation. In his view, a valid exercise of police power restrict-
ing the use of property required no compensation. Eminent domain
alone raised the compensation issue. Thus, use restrictions, even
total use prohibitions, were valid without compensation if pursuant
to a valid police power objective.
According to Mugler, the validity of police power objectives is
a question of substantive due process and not just compensation.
It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for
the promotion of these ends [public health, morals and safety] is
to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of police powers of the State.
There are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot
rightfully go. While every possible presumption is to be indulged
in favor of the validity of a statute, Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S.
718, the courts must obey the Constitution rather than the lawmak-
ing department of government .... If, therefore, a statute pur-
porting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public
morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to
those objects, or is a palable invasion of rights secured by the fun-
damental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby
give effect to the Constitution.12
Several years later, the United States Supreme Court precisely
defined the substantive due process analysis as it relates to the po-
lice power in Lawton v. Steele: 'I
To justify the State in ... interposing its authority in behalf of
the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public...
require such interference; and second, that the means are reason-
ably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not un-
duly oppressive upon individuals.
14
Thus, before the turn of the century, the United States Supreme
Court had defined the analytical limits of the police power and had
precluded the use of "compensation" to remedy an unconstitutional
exercise of that power. Even though confusion and misconception
11. Id. at 669 (Emphasis added).
12. Id. at 661.
13. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
14. Id. at 136-37.
reign where the taking issue is concerned, these principles have
been consistently affirmed.
The Holmes decision in Pennsylvania Coal is responsible for much
of the confusion. Justice Holmes suggested that results should not
turn on the characterization of state action as being pursuant to
either the eminent domain power or the police power. Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon.15 Although there is broad practical over-
lap between the Harlan position as enunciated in Mugler v. Kansas
and the Holmes position articulated in Pennsylvania Coal, the dif-
ferences in approach are significant.
The Pennsylvania Coal case was born of the physical phenomena
known as "subsidence" which is caused by the removal of anthra-
cite coal from beneath the earth's surface. The surface tends to
collapse when its support is thus removed causing great damage
to structures on the surface as well as water, sewer and gas lines
running under the streets.
The coal companies had owned much of the land in the anthra-
cite region but had sold parts of it, retaining the mineral rights
and extracting from the buyer a waiver of the right to recover for
damages from subsidence. However, in 1921, the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted the Kohler Act prohibiting coal mining con-
ducted so as to cause subsidence which might damage virtually any
public or private structure on or beneath the earth's surface. 16
Later the same year, H. J. Mahon received notice from Pennsyl-
vania Coal that mining beneath his home had reached a point where
subsidence would result in the near future. Mahon sought to enjoin
mining beneath his property on the ground that such activity would
violate the Pennsylvania anti-subsidence statute. The coal com-
pany responded that the act was unconstitutional in that (1) it im-
paired the waiver of action provision of the land sales contract, and
(2) took property for a public purpose without compensation by
depriving the company of its mining rights.
Many courts and legal commentators have taken the questionable
position that the Court disregarded the contract question and dis-
posed of the case on the "taking" issue. Even though Justice
Holmes discussed in some detail the protections afforded by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution,
the discussion was probably dictum and was at most an alternative
holding.' 7 Following the often cited dimunition in value analysis,
15. 260 U.S. at 415.
16. Id. at 412-13.
17. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES AND J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 243-44
(1973) [hereinafter cited as the TAKING ISSUE] points to a letter from Jus-
[VOL. 2: S79, 1974] Land Use
PEPPERDINE LAW REVEW
Justice Holmes stated as follows:
But the question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes
desired should fall. So far as private persons or communities have
seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot
see that the fact that their risk has become a danger warrants the
giving to them greater rights than they bought.1 8
Notwithstanding, Justice Holmes' analysis of the "taking" issue,
the opinion offered no indication that just compensation would be
available as an alternative remedy to equitable relief from the ap-
plication of an unconstitutional regulation. Thus, even under
Justice Holmes' analysis, when a regulation amounts to a "taking"
because it goes "too far" it is unconstitutional and cannot be ap-
plied. To assert a contrary position would create the anomalous
position of declaring that a governmental entity cannot enforce a
particular regulation because it is unconstitutional, but if it chooses
to enforce the unconstitutional regulation it must pay for diminu-
tion in value caused thereby. This position is not only legally un-
tenable but also subverts the statutory framework relating to the
process of acquisition by eminent domain.
Nonetheless, many courts have seized upon the Court's comment
that "if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking"
to support the proposition that the distinction between eminent
domain and the police power is a difference in the degree and not
a difference in the kind of regulation. These same courts appar-
ently assume that if the degree is great there is not only a "taking"
but compensation may also be required.
Lest any confusion be created by the perhaps unfortunate lan-
guage of Justice Holmes, the Court soon reaffirmed the principles
of Mugler, at least with respect to the land-use regulatory power,
in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.19 The taking issue was squarely
presented by a real estate developer. The per acre value of his
tract fell from $10,000 to $2,500 when it was zoned to seriously
restrict the industrial use previously contemplated for the site.20
tice Holmes to Frederick Pollock, HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, 108-09 (M.
HowE ed. 1941), wherein Justice Holmes expressed the actual grounds upon
which the Pennsylvania Coal decision was based: "My ground (for deci-
sion) is that the public only got on this land by paying for it and that
if they saw fit to pay only for the surface rights they can't enlarge it. .
18. 260 U.S. at 416 (Emphasis added).
19. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
20. Id. at 384.
The 'Court declined to determine whether this reduction in value
was sufficient to constitute a taking under the asserted Pennsyl-
vania Coal doctrine. Rather, the Court upheld the zoning ordinance
as a valid exercise of the police power without reaching the taking
issue per se. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Holmes joined
in this decision.
Numerous police power objectives were cited as being promoted
by the zoning ordinance. The Court then fell back on the presump-
tion of valid legislative enactment.
If these reasons, thus summarized, do not demonstrate the wis-
dom or sound policy in all respects of those restrictions which we
have indicated as pertinent to the inquiry, at least, the reasons are
sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said
before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such
provisions are arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. 21
This is unmistakably the substantive due process standard: the
Pennsylvania Coal case did not preempt the Mugler approach. The
Court ignored the diminution in value and focused entirely upon
the validity of the police power objectives.
The opposite result on similar reasoning was reached in Nectow
v. City of 'Cambridge,2 2 where a plot of land was zoned for resi-
dential use even though surrounded by industrial uses. As in Eu-
clid, the Court noted the serious diminution in value but decided
the case, as it should have, on the basis of substantive due process.
The particular zone involved was found to be arbitrary and un-
reasonable in that it was not indispensable to the general plan em-
bodied in the zoning ordinance as a whole. Thus the ordinance
was found to be unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff's prop-
erty and its enforcement enjoined. As in Pennsylvania Coal, the
regulation was invalidated on constitutional grounds and compensa-
tion was not required.
After the 1920's, the Supreme Court fell silent with respect to
land-use controls and the taking issue. In 1962, this silence was
broken by Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, New York. 2s
In Goldblatt, the Court sustained an ordinance which effectively
prohibited the defendants from further utilizing their land for sand
and gravel mining, a use to which it had been long devoted. The
prohibition was accomplished by outlawing quarrying operations
below the water table, a point already passed by defendants.
21. 272 U.S. at 395.
22. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
23. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
'S86
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The case has been cited for the proposition that an otherwise valid
ordinance is not unconstitutional because it deprives property of
its beneficial uses. However, even a cursory examination of the
opinion reveals this to be in error. The ordinance was upheld
merely because of the presumption in favor of statutory validity.
The Court went to great lengths to emphasize that the record was
devoid of the input necessary to either uphold or condemn the ord-
inance. Although the ordinance prohibited the use to which the
property previously had been devoted, there was no finding with
respect to the availability of alternative uses. Conversely, the town
failed to produce evidence to show that the ordinance was reason-
ably calculated to promote the public health, safety, morals or wel-
fare.
More significantly, the Court cites both Mugler and Pennsylvania
Coal, with approval. Given the apparent inconsistency between the
two cases, one would hardly expect that both doctrinal approaches
could survive side by side. Mugler announced that a valid police
power restriction on use of property cannot be a taking requiring
compensation, so long as the owner remains in possession and con-
trol of his property. Pennsylvania Coal announced that a severe
private property injury may amount to an attempted unconstitu-
tional "taking"-no mention was made of the just compensation
question. Goldblatt implicitly resolves the inconsistency.
Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, initially noted that the
:ordinance completely prohibits the beneficial use to which the
property has previously been devoted but warned that such char-
acterization is not determinative of whether or not the ordinance
is unconstitutional.
It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily
speaks as a prohibition. If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exer-
cise of the town's police powers, the fact that it deprives the
property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitu-
tional.24
The Court then cites Mugler v. Kansas for the proposition that
the constitutionality of an exercise of the police power must be de-
termined by substantive due process standards and not by the prin-
ciples of eminent domain. After agreeing with Mugler that the dif-
ference between the police power and the power of eminent domain
24. Id. at 592 (Citations omitted).
is one of kind and not degree, the Court then apparently qualifies
this principle by citing Pennsylvania Coal for the proposition that,
"governmental action, in the form of regulation cannot be so oner-
ous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires com-
pensation. '25 Again, the inconsistency appears but is quickly clari-
fied by the Court when Justice Clark redefines the constitutional
limits of the police power:
To evaluate its reasonableness we therefore need to know such
things as the nature of the menace against which it will protect,
the availability and effectiveness of other less drastic protective
steps, and the loss which appellants will suffer from the imposition
of the ordinance.26
It is evident that the diminution in value test announced by Penn-
sylvania Coal is merely one element in the substantive due process
analysis, and not the dispositive factor in resolving the question
of compensation. The peripheral relationship of the diminution in
value test to the validity and compensability of an exercise of the
police power is re-enforced by the Court's statement that, "although
a comparison of values before and after is relevant, see, Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, it is by no means conclusive. '27
Accordingly when a land-use regulatory manifestation of the po-
lice power is challenged, the threshold question is whether the chal-
lenged regulation meets the reasonable means/legitimate end test
required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth amendment.
In evaluating the reasonableness of the means employed, one factor
for consideration is the loss in value suffered by the landowner
by virtue of the regulations. If the regulation meets the substan-
tive due process standards, notwithstanding a severe diminution in
value, the exercise of the police power is, a priori, valid; a compens-
able "taking" cannot occur because the taking issue turns on the
same substantive due process standards. If, on the other hand, the
challenged regulation fails because either the means employed are
unreasonable or the end sought is beyond the authority of the gov-
ernmental entity, the exercise of the police power is constitutionally
infirm and, therefore, cannot be enforced. Courts have alterna-
tively couched the legal conclusion of unconstitutionality in terms
of "denial of due process" and a "taking without just compensation".
Whatever the legal conclusion, the remedy of just compensation is
inconsistent with the due process analysis leading thereto. Requir-
ing compensation would explicitly sanction the enforcement of an
exercise of the police power, whether or not constitutionally valid.
25. Id. at 594.
26. Id. at 595 (Emphasis added).
27. Id. at 594.
[VOL. 2: S79, 1974] Land Use
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
An illegal exercise of the police power can never amount to a consti-
tutionally compensable taking.
II. NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA
Two recent decisions, in Pennsylvania and New York, have con-
cluded that equitable relief only, is available to remedy an unconsti-
tutional exercise of the police power, notwithstanding the threshold
determination that the constitutional infirmity is grounded on the
"taking" clause.
In Gaebel v. Thornbury Township,28 the landowner alleged that
the so-called "down-zoning" of his property required compensation
because of the severe restriction in use. The Court found the fol-
lowing language from, In White's appeal,29 dispositive of the land-
owner's claim for damages in inverse condemnation:
Police power should not be confused with that of eminent
domain. Police power controls the use of property by the owner
for the public good its use otherwise being harmful, while
eminent domain and taxation take property for public use. Under
eminent domain, compensation is given for property taken, in-
jured or destroyed, while under the police power no payment is
made for diminution in use, even though it amounts to an actual
taking or destruction of property ....
... If...there is doubt as to whether the statute is enacted for
a recognized police object, or if, conceding its purpose, its exercise
goes too far, it then becomes the judicial duty to [investigate and]
declare the given exercise of the police power invalid .... *0
Accordingly the court held that the property owner's "exclusive re-
course is to challenge the constitutionality of Thornbury's zoning
ordinance .... 1
Likewise, in Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New
York, 32 the landowner also claimed damages in inverse condemna-
tion by virtue of "down-zoning." The Court held that the re-zoning
of the landowner's property was an unconstitutional exercise of the
police power but refused to permit the alternative remedy of "just
compensation." The Court followed the "taking calculus" estab-
lished by Mugler v. Kansas, in reasoning that:
28. 8 Pa. C. 399, 303 A.2d 57 (1973).
29. 287 Pa. 259, 264-65, 134 A. 409, 411 (1926).
30. 303 A.2d at 59 (Emphasis added).
31. Id. at 60.
32. 352 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1973).
If the change in the use of the property is incidental to a valid
exercise of the sovereign's police powers dictated by sound con-
siderations of public safety, health and welfare, then it is a consti-
tutionally privileged act for which no compensation need be paid.
(Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205.)33
In contrast, if the challenged police power exercise is found consti-
tutionally infirm, the only available remedy, in the absence of phys-
ical appropriation, is to restore the property to the zoning classifica-
tion existing prior to the unconstitutional act. 4
III. CALIFORNIA CASES
Some courts have assumed, without analysis, that an invalid ex-
ercise of the police power may require just compensation. These
courts have looked solely to the value diminution principle dis-
cussed by the court in Pennsylvania Coal, to determine whether
a compensable taking has occurred. The California Supreme Court
however, has consistently avoided such blind adherence to a doc-
trine that cannot and should not be applied to land-use regulations.
Most prominent among these cases are Consolidated Rock Prod-
ucts Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 3 and McCarthy v. City of Manhat-
tan Beach.3 6 In Consolidated Rock, the Court distinguished Penn-
sylvania Coal by stating as follows:
It was decided before the principles of comprehensive zoning
were established and differs from our case additionally in that the
mining was to be done underground and the persons to be benefited
by the legislation were grantees as to whom the right to mine had
been expressly reserved.87
In McCarthy, the Court based the distinction on the contractural
waiver:
While plaintiffs recognize that some value incident to property
must yield to the police power, they argue that the zoning restric-
tion as applied to their beach land goes beyond mere regulation
and constitutes an unwarranted interference with the use of their
property so as to exceed the scope of permissible zoning. They cite
in particular the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 413 [43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322]. But as there stated, 'the
question depends upon the particular facts.' That was an action
between two private parties, the statute involved admittedly de-
stroyed previously existing rights of property and contract as re-
served between the parties, and the propriety of the statute's pro-
hibition upon the single valuable use of the property for coal-
mining operations was considered in relation to special benefits to
be gained by an individual rather than by the whole community.
33.. Id. at 765 (Citations omitted).
34. Id. at 768.
35. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1962).
36. 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953).
37. 57 Cal. 2d at 528, 370 P.2d at 350, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
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In those circumstances application of the statute to the property
was held to effect such diminution in its value as to be unconsti-
tutional and beyond the legitimate scope of the police power.38
The California courts have consistently adhered to a strict Mugler
v. Kansas approach to the compensation issue. Where a proper ex-
ercise of the police power injures private property no compensation
is required. If the police power exercise is found invalid, the only
remedy available is equitable relief. Only in the event that (1)
title is taken, or (2) property is otherwise invaded, or (3) the in-
jury results from an intentional effort to reduce the value of the
property in the event of future acquisition by eminent domain, will
compensation then be a proper remedy.
The taking issue aside, three Court of Appeal decisions have been
cited as adding an additional exception to the no compensation rule
we have outlined herein.39 It seems clear that compensation is re-
quired where an attempted police power exercise results in a phys-
ical invasion or appropriation. 40  These land-use cases have been
thought to add precondemnation property value manipulation as
an exception to the no-compensation rule. Our analysis shows this
to be error. At the outset it must be noted that one of the three
did not require compensation and the other two were physical in-
vasion cases.
In Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, the plaintiff land developer
had applied for and received building permits and had commenced
construction of apartment buildings on property situated one mile
from the southerly end of the San Fernando Airport. The Los
38. 41 Cal. 2d at 890-91, 264 P.2d at 938-39.
39. Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr.
318 (1963); Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 391 (1969); Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454,
327 P.2d 10 (1958).
40. A student comment in the Stanford Law Review [Fulham, Scharf,
Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a
Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439 (1974)] has difficulty fitting Byd-
Ion v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959) into this exception.
That case, however, involved a regulation which cut off access to certain
private property. Access is an essential property right and the regulation
took the property as surely as if the government had constructed a fence
around the private property with a sign saying "keep out property of the
United States." While the physical invasion present in Pumpelly was absent
in Bydlon the distinction doesn't seem persuasive and we think the case
falls into this category.
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Angeles City Council, upon being informed by one of its members
of this development "within the area that will shortly be acquired
for airport purposes",41 requested the Board of Airport Commis-
sioners to "consider condemning this property in order that the
same may be acquired on the basis of its present value as vacant
land."' 4 2 Two days later the City 'Council adopted an emergency
ordinance "down zoning" the property from R-3 to R-1 and the
plaintiff's construction was curtailed. The new zoning reduced the
value of the property from $114,000 to $48,000. The City Council
justified this action on the ground that it was to prevent "an undue
congestion of population ' '4" in the area and thus expose fewer
people to the hazards arising from operation of the airfield.
The Court held that the new zoning ordinance was invalid. Three
grounds were specifically set forth for the invalidation and a fourth
was suggested.
First the Court found that the zoning ordinance was illegal spot-
zoning.44 Looking to the police power objectives set forth by the
City to justify the zoning, the court found that the hazards arising
from the operation of the airfield were equally applicable to nearby
properties which had been allowed to develop in the manner in
which plaintiff had sought to develop. Further the Court found
that the cited hazards had existed at the time the property was
originally zoned R-3 and that there had been no change in circum-
stances to justify a down-zoning or to justify a variation between
the zoning upon plaintiff's property and the properties nearby.
Therefore the ordinance constituted illegal "spot-zoning" and was
invalid.
A second ground for invalidation of the down zoning ordinance
was that plaintiff had acquired a vested right to construct the mul-
tiple dwellings. He had commenced work on the construction pur-
suant to building permits granted by the City prior to the zoning
change. The Court said:
Plaintiffs thus had a vested right to construct the multiple dwell-
ings for which the permits had been issued, and the ordinance if
enforced as to these lots would result in the taking of plaintiff's
property without compensation and without due process of law.4"
It should be well noted that the fact that the ordinance, if enforced,
would result in the taking of plaintiff's property without compen-
41. 161 Cal. App. 2d at 457, 327 P.2d at 13.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 458, 327 P.2d at 14.
44. Id. at 460, 327 P.2d at 15.
45. Id. at 463, 327 P.2d at 16-17.
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sation did not require the payment of compensation. Rather the
fact of taking without compensation was a ground for invalidating
the ordinance. Enforcement of the ordinance would have an uncon-
stitutional result. Therefore the ordinance was void.
The third ground set forth for an invalidation of the ordinance
was the failure of the City to follow the procedures outlined in
its own Charter for the enactment of rezoning ordinances. The City
had failed to refer the rezoning to the Planning Commission for
investigation and public hearing. Therefore the rezoning had not
been properly enacted and was invalid.
The case of Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles has been cited for
a fourth proposition: a harsh zoning regulation calculatingly de-
signed to decrease future condemnation costs will result in a de
facto taking requiring compensation. Klopping v. City of Whit-
tier.46 A careful reader of the Kissinger opinion, however, searches
in vain for such a statement. The Court did find, "that the purpose
of the ordinance was to depress the value of plaintiffs' property
in order that it might be acquired for airport purposes at such de-
pressed value is crystal clear from the evidence. '47 The Court, how-
ever, made no attempt to rest its decision on this ground. The com-
ment comes in the context of the Court's discussion of the illegal
spot-zoning aspects of the rezoning ordinance in question. Even
if the Court rested its decision upon the precondemnation aspect
of the rezoning ordinace, no compensation was due on account of
this "bad motive."
When examined in context, the Kissinger court's finding, that the
purpose of the rezoning ordinance was to restrict increases in the
property value, relates to the validity of the police power exercised.
The Court found that there was not a reasonable relationship be-
tween the rezoning and the police power objective cited by the City.
The Court then turned to the apparent real purpose behind the
ordinance and found that that purpose could not support the
ordinance. The unstated conclusion of the Court is that manipula-
tion of property values in contemplation of future condemnation
is not a valid police power objective. An ordinance enacted pur-
suant to such objective is therefore invalid. This invalidity does
46. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 46, 500 P.2d 1345, 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1972).
47. 161 Cal. App. 2d at 462, 327 P.2d at 16.
not require compensation but, rather, prohibits enforcement of the
ordinance.
A second California airport zoning case illustrates how a zoning
ordinance can be the basis of an inverse condemnation suit a la
Pumpelly v. Green Bay. In Sneed v. County of Riverside,4s the
plaintiff alleged that by reason of aircraft operations over his
property and a "zoning" ordinance the County took from him an
air navigation easement over approximately 60 acres of his prop-
erty. The alleged easement ranged from 4 feet in height at that
part of the property closest to the airport to a height of 75 feet
farthest away. The height restriction ordinance precluded plain-
tiff's existing use of the land as a thoroughbred race horse breeding
ranch and reduced the value from $550,000 to $225,000.
Two factors respecting the Sneed case should be noted carefully.
First the County of Riverside was not only the zoning authority
but also owned and operated the airport involved. Secondly, the
airport was in use and the airspace over plaintiff's property was
being used in aircraft takeoff and landing maneuvers prior to and
at the time of the suit.
The case was on appeal from a ruling of the trial court dismissing
the complaint without leave to amend pursuant to the defendant's
demurrer. The issue before the Court, then, was whether the com-
plaint stated a cause of action for inverse condemnation. The plain-
tiff set forth two bases upon which compensation was allegedly
due: first, that the County obtained an easement through the plain-
tiff's airspace by virtue of the height restriction ordinance; second,
aircraft repeatedly invaded his airspace at the direction of defend-
ants' flight control employees. The Court of Appeal found that
a cause of action in inverse condemnation had been stated.
The complaint did not allege that compensation was due by vir-
tue of the adverse effect that the zoning ordinance had upon plain-
tiff's property values. Nor did the complaint allege that the zoning
was an attempt to influence property values in contemplation of
future eminent domain action.49
The Court succinctly stated the issue presented on appeal:
The basic controversy is whether the Riverside ordinance is in real-
ity a height limit ordinance authorized under the police power or
whether it takes an air easement over plaintiff's property without
payment of compensation therefor.50
48. See supra note 39.
49. Like Kissinger, Sneed was cited for such a proposition in Kopping
v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d at 46, 500 P.2d at 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
That issue, however was not before the court in Sneed and was not dis-
cussed by the court in its opinion.
50. 218 Cal. App. 2d at 208, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
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The Court determined that building restrictions near airports
were different in kind from the more common building height regu-
lations.
We believe there is a distinction between the commonly accepted
and traditional height restriction zoning regulations of buildings
and zoning of airport approaches in that the latter contemplates
actual use of the airspace zoned, by aircraft, whereas in the build-
ing cases there is no invasion or trespass of the area above the
restricted zone.51
The Court then discussed the major cases in the United States
which have held that an airport operator is liable for the easement
taken by repeated aircraft maneuvers over the property adjacent
to an airport runway. The Court in a lengthy quote from the lead-
ing case of Ackerman v. Port of Seattle,52 stated a major distinction
between non-compensable police power exercises and compensable
exercises of eminent domain.
But, when private property rights are taken from the individual
and are conferred upon the public for public use, eminent domain
principles are applicable.53
The Sneed case stands for the limited proposition that a cause
of action in inverse condemnation is stated where the complaint
alleges that an airport operator has caused aircraft to invade the
airspace over an adjacent landowner's property and where the air-
port operator, through its zoning power, has attempted to take a
license to permit such invasions without the payment of compensa-
tion. The cases cited by the Court support the proposition that re-
peated invasion of airspace by lowflying aircraft is sufficient to
state a cause of action in inverse condemnation against the airport
operator who directed such flights. The zoning aspect of the case
was, therefore, superfluous to the stating of a cause of action. The
zoning ordinance, however, clearly had the effect of dedicating the
airspace over plaintiff's property to public airport use. Thus, the
County of Riverside was physically invading plaintiff's property
just as was done in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.
In Peacock v. County of Sacramento,5 4 a lower court finding of
inverse condemnation was upheld. The case involved a parcel of
51. Id. at 209, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 320 (Emphasis added).
52. 55 Wash. 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
53. 218 Cal. App. 2d at 211, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
54. See supra note 39.
land located near the end of a private airport runway. The County
had been contemplating acquisition of the airport as well as the
land nearby for a clear air space zone at the end of the runway.
A height zoning ordinance was adopted which effectively precluded
plaintiff's plans for placing a residential development on the land
and eliminated all other uses to which the land might have been
adapted. After denying building permits and delaying for a period
of nearly five years, the County abandoned the airport acquisition
plan.
The Court of Appeal summarized the trial court's findings of fact
and affirmed the trial court's conclusion that compensation was re-
quired for the de facto taking of plaintiff's land. The Court of Ap-
peals was content to recite the County's contentions on appeal and
knocked them down like strawmen. For this reason there is no
cogent rationale for the Court's decision set forth in the opinion.
However, by carefully reading the trial court findings, as set forth
by the Court on appeal, one can ascertain the basis for the decision
and harmonize it with prior California cases.
On its face, the Peacock decision may be said to stand for the
proposition that an invalid attempt at police power regulations can
require compensation. It is clear, however, that the case involved
actual physical invasion of plaintiff's air space by aircraft maneu-
vers in connection with takeoffs and landings at the airport. 55 Thus
the case falls within the Sneed rule. There was, in addition, a
strong indication of a pre-condemnation seizure of plaintiff's prop-
erty.
In May of 1960, the County imposed restrictions upon plaintiff's
property which prevented all beneficial uses. The restrictions were
part of an interim study ordinance and the trial court sustained
their validity during the period while the County was studying the
airport acquisition and related land use policies. In November of
1963, however, the study stage ended and the County reached a de-
cision to proceed with the airport plan. Nevertheless, the restric-
tions on plaintiff's land were continued without a formal exercise
of eminent domain. The trial court found that at the point in 1963
when the general plan was adopted reflecting the airport acqui-
sition and attendant condemnation plans, the County had effec-
tively condemned plaintiff's land for public use.
55. Throughout the life of the ordinance the airport began and continued
operations as a public facility by means of a lease-leaseback agreement
entered into between the private owners of the airport and the county: 271
Cal. App. 2d at 848, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 395. This case, like Sneed, falls within
the physical invasion rule and need not be distinguished as was attempted
in 26 STAN. L. REv. at 1449.
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A very key finding should be noted. Even though the airport
was privately owned, the County entered into a lease-leaseback
agreement with the private owner. Thus the County acquired a
public interest in the airfield and said field was operated as a public
facility. Thus, without going further, a claim for inverse condem-
nation as in Sneed was stated. The public air facility caused air-
craft used by the public to invade the airspace over the plaintiff's
land. This invasion was supplemented by the County's ordinance
which precluded building upon the land and thereby effectively
took a license for such invasion. The Court of Appeal found the
Sneed decision to be directly applicable. The Court quoted a dis-
cussion of the Sneed case in Morse v. The County of San Luis
Obispo:5 6
In Sneed, the County of Riverside enacted an ordinance imposing
height restrictions on all structures on certain property, the effect
of which was to create an easement in the airspace over plaintiff's
property for use as an approach zone to the county airport.
Large numbers of aircraft took off and landed at the airport by
flying at low altitudes over his property. The basic issue, accord-
ing to the court, was whether the Riverside ordinance was a height-
limit ordinance authorized by the police power or whether in real-
ity it created an air easement over plaintiff's property without the
payment of compensation. After distinguishing between municipal
regulations which restrict or destroy certain rights indigenous to
private ownership of property (non-compensable losses) and regu-
lations which transferred those rights to public enjoyment (com-
pensable takings), the court concluded that a regulation which low-
ers the height of existing buildings within the approach patterns
of an airport contemplates a public use of airspace above private
land, in effect an air easement, for which compensation must be
paid .... 57
The Court went further in Peacock, however, by finding the tak-
ing of a fee simple rather than an easement. This result seems
predicated upon the fact that the ordinance in Peacock precluded
all uses.
Another major factor which explains the Peacock decision is the
County's avowed purpose to take plaintiff's land by eminent
domain. The trial court noted that one purpose of the interim
study restrictions was to preclude an increasein the value of plain-
tiff's property. However, the motivation to manipulate property
56. 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967).
57. 271 Cal. App. 2d at 861, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 402-03 (Emphasis added).
values by the use of zoning regulations does not appear to have
been central to the trial court's decision.
The rationale seems clear. The County officials had repeatedly
assured plaintiff that his land would be purchased by the public.
When these plans became firm, that is on the date when the general
plan was adopted, plaintiff found himself owning land which he
could not use for any purpose and which would be condemned by
the public at some indefinite future date. The Court quite logically
concluded, then, that the seizure of plaintiff's land occurred when
the interim study phase of the project ended.
Compensation became due only when the County's intention to
take the property by eminent domain became fixed. At that time
the Court found that compensation was due, not because of the in-
tention to manipulate property values, but because plaintiff had
been effectively denied all beneficial uses of his property. Plaintiff
found himself in the same position as if eminent domain had been
exercised; he could not use the land and the public was enjoying
his airspace. Compensation was due because of a de facto exercise
of eminent domain through total use prohibition and invasion of
airspace.
The Peacock case is an anomaly because the County abandoned
its plans to acquire the airport and released all the restrictions oil
plaintiff's land. The decision to abandon the plans was not con-
nected with the lawsuit, but was motivated by an independent dif-
ficulty encountered in negotiations with the private owners of the
airport. Thus even assuming that the Court was correct in its
analysis that plaintiff had been denied all use of his property,58
the denial was only temporary. Yet the County of Sacramento
found itself acquiring a fee simple absolute in land for which the
public no longer had use. While it may be fair to say that compen-
sation was due to Mr. Peacock for the period in which he was forced
to hold his land out of beneficial use, it seems absurd to have re-
quired the County to pay for more than it took. In the absence
of some special showing that Peacock suffered an irretrievable op-
portunity loss or that he could make no reasonable use of his land
after the restrictions were removed, it seemed that the County
should have paid only for his losses occasioned by the temporary
use prohibition.
IV. SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND PROPOSALS
Arguments attempting to establish when compensation ought to
.58. 271 Cal. App. 2d at 864, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
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be paid for diminution in property value resulting from land use
regulations are many and varied. Persuasive policy considerations
support each point of view. We feel that the present state of the
law is over balanced against the private property owner whose
plans may apparently be frustrated at the whim of public agencies
which need not bear the burden of paying compensation for losses
occasioned by unconstitutional regulations. At the same time, we
feel the solution proposed in HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, would
shift the balance too far against public agencies attempting to reg-
ulate the use of private property. We think a more reasonable de-
lineation is possible and desirable.
A landowner who finds his development plans frustrated by a
purported police power regulation is quite justified in feeling that
some of his property has been taken by the government. The down-
zoning situation is a rather poignant example of where a landowner
finds the value of his property greatly reduced by a governmental
action. When the regulations are motivated by environmental con-
sideration, as they are so frequently in the present political at-
mosphere, the landowner cannot be blamed for feeling that the pub-
lic ought to share in the costs of preserving the natural environ-
ment.
The present state of the law, as we have seen above, does not
provide the frustrated landowner with an adequate remedy. If an
unconstitutional regulation has been imposed upon his land, his
only recourse is to seek invalidation of a purported regulation. He
is not entitled to compensation for the costs involved in the delay
of his project. All too often the costs of righting the wrong exceed
the damage sustained by the wronged.
.On the other hand, persuasive arguments exist against any re-
quirement that government must pay for good faith, though mis-
taken, attempts to regulate private property for the public good.
Local governments should not be made guarantors of private prop-
erty owner expectations. The public treasury is insufficient to pay
for all property value diminutions resulting from attempted regula-
tions.
Perhaps the most serious impact of HFH, Ltd. and the supposed
holding of Peacock is the chilling effect they might have on future
attempts to regulate the use of land. Land use regulation is one
of the most vital functions performed by local government today.
As population increases, and desirable land resources diminish, the
pressure on local government for development will become even
more intense. If legislative discretion is encumbered by burdens
such as the decision in HFH, Ltd., our land resources will be un-
avoidably squandered to the detriment of the public. Faced with
the possibility of enormous inverse condemnation damages, local
governments may well forgo attempts to regulate the use of private
property.
The present state of the law is unsatisfactory in that it allows
land use restriction with impunity. Local governments need not
fear the possibility of paying for impacts on private property caused
by land use regulation. If the regulation is valid, no compensation
is due. If the regulation is unconstitutional, the landowner is
limited to declaratory relief and may not obtain damages. The
HFH, Ltd. solution, however, goes too far to correct this imbalance.
Not only would the HFH "holding" require compensation for dam-
ages occasioned by valid land use regulations, but it would also al-
low an invalid regulation to continue in existence and charge the
local government for the damages.
We think a middle ground is more reasonable. No compensation
whatsoever should be allowed where the land use regulation im-
posed is valid. But if a court finds an attempted regulation to be
unconstitutional, it should be invalidated. The landowner should
also be allowed to recover for the temporary loss he suffered during
the operation of the invalid regulation (assuming he took reason-
ably prompt steps to invalidate the offending regulation). In this
manner the property owner could be made whole, and the govern-
ment would not pay for more than it took.
This proposal raises potentially difficult problems of valuation.
It may be that in some instances, because of changed economic situ-
ation, the delay occasioned by the invalid land use regulation will
irretrievably cost the landowner his opportunity for reasonable de-
velopment. We think these situations would be rare. In most cases
the landowner should be limited to his holding costs and legal fees.
The burden would be upon the landowner to establish that his de-
velopment was imminent and was delayed by the regulation.
We think that it is an unreasonable perversion of the law to allow
an unreasonable and unconstitutional land use regulation to con-
tinue in existence and to require the local government to pay the
damages occasioned thereby. It seems much more rational to in-
validate the offending regulation and to require payment for the
damage incurred between enactment and invalidation.
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